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Transition and accession have necessitated the establishment of a regulatory 
framework for agricultural crop biotechnology in Poland. This paper examines the 
theoretical and practical difficulties of complying with EU requirements. The first part 
of the study utilises evolutionary theory and path dependency to describe how policy 
makers interpret the requirements of accession through established conceptual 
models. Secondly the paper examines how accession programmes may alter path 
dependent trajectory but is simultaneously introducing or importing models which are 
fundamentally incompatible with national capabilities. Data presents the pre-
accession capacity building programmes and the import of German expertise as 
examples. The final section examines the issue of capacity and in particular, financial 
capacity, and uses this underlying theme to explore in detail why incompatibilities 
arise and why EU compliance is presented with certain obstacles.  
Introduction 
 
Poland has an economic foundation rooted in its agrarian base and a modern history 
of advanced biotechnology capability under its former soviet government. A 
compilation by (Tzotzos and Skyrabin 2000) of known research facilities indicates a 
likely presence of activity in the agri-biotech sector. The attractiveness of Eastern 
European countries as a testing ground for large multinationals is also a possibility 
that has not escaped media reports  (ANPED, MURE et al. 2000; Brown 2004). Aside 
from the capability of hosting agricultural crop biotechnology advances, Poland 
became formally part of the EU in May 2004. Fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria 
means obligatory adoption of the vast part of the Acquis Communautaire. This 
necessitates the positioning of a regulatory framework to govern agri-biotech activity 
which is compatible with EU directives. The need to implement and enforce 
regulation in the area of agricultural biotechnology is therefore approaching from two 
directions. 
 
This paper examines the current situation of Poland and its progression towards 
developing an agri-biotech regulatory framework and the sources of difficulty which 
may in theory and in practice, limit the extent to which both a successful national 
strategy and compliance with EU directives is achieved. Specifically, government 
institutions are examined and the argument is made that many of the difficulties 
faced are historically embedded in the organisational development of these 
institutions. Accession both necessitates and catalyses change though the capability 
for change is affected by certain limited capacities. Section one of this paper utilises 
evolutionary theory and path dependency to describe how policy makers interpret the 
requirements of accession through established conceptual models. Section two 
examines how accession programmes may alter path dependent trajectory but is 
simultaneously introducing or importing models which are fundamentally 
incompatible with national capabilities. The third section uses Jänike’s definition of 
capacity to explore in detail these incompatibilities and why EU compliance is 
presented with certain obstacles. The data for this paper is sourced from an MSc 
project carried out in September 2005 and uses a comparative grey literature 
analysis of the main EC directives and Polish national policy documents and data 
from semi-structured interviews conducted with academic researchers, consultants 
and policy makers. 
Background 
 
There are approximately 2.5 million farms in Poland; however 80% of marketed 
agricultural produce is produced in only 300,000 farms. The remaining farms are 
mostly small holder subsistence farms. These farms have a reduced need for credit 
and are independent of the market. The bigger farms are more dependent on the 
banking system and are driven to lower the costs of production as far as possible. 
They therefore have shown an interest in growing GM crops, particularly the 
herbicide resistant and Bt varieties of maize. This is especially so in the South-West 
region where the European Corn Borer presents a problem. 
 
There have been some recent reports of the illegal growing of GM canola in the 
Polish media, but inspections have shown these reports to be unfounded. Research 
informants have suggested that the majority of voters and politicians don’t agree with 
the growing of GM crops in Poland and this has been followed by 15 out of 17 local 
government districts in Poland declaring themselves as GM-free. (These GM-free 
zones do not hold legal status or official recognition and may be simply an 
expression of opinion, but are important nevertheless). The farming unions as 
expected, are large and influential though the proportions of subsistence and 
commercial farmers represented are not known at the time of this study. 
 
Applications and the dossier submitted for approval for the modification, trade or 
growing of GM crops is passed first to the bureau for GMO’s, which checks for 
accuracy of the technical specifications and completeness of administrative 
information. The non-confidential parts of the dossier are then placed on the 
government website for public viewing. It is then passed to the Commission which 
forwards the dossier along with a recommendation to the Minister of the 
Environment. Currently nearly all applications are for Class 1 research (contained 
use) and are submitted by universities and research institutes. 
 
The current act on GMO’s is likely to be replaced by a new Law on GMO’s. 2005 is 
an election year and a new parliament will be convened in September. Under Polish 
law, all acts not passed by the old parliament do not have to be passed by the new 
one. However, it is hoped that the new law will be accepted and will be in place 
sometime in 2006. 
 
The new law contains several amendments which will impact on regulation and the 
bureaucracy of GMO’s. Under the old law it was the decision of the Polish minister of 
the environment whether to permit the placing on the market of a GMO. This has 
become the competence of EU authorities. For class 1 research, no permission is 
needed according to the new law. The Polish Ministry of Environment need only be 
notified, a shorter version of the normal dossier submitted, and then the research can 
commence if the ministry does not protest within two weeks. The issue of co-
existence will feature more prominently after some grappling with the EU’s perceived 
lack of guidance in this area. How EU regulations are interpreted and who’s if any 
example is used when the rules on co-existence are settled, will bear on the title of 
this project, but until the new law is produced and debated on, the effects will be 
unknown. 
 
The new law will also specify a new structure for the commission and its role in 
decision making. All 19 members are to be scientists and experts in the plant 
biotechnology field. The commission will be restricted to providing advice only on the 
scientific and technical aspects of the dossier. This is a change from the current 
situation in which the 19 members of the GMO commission include government 
representatives from public health, agriculture, national defence, economy, transport, 
science, the environment and a representative from the office of competition and 
consumer protection. There are seven representatives from ‘scientific circles’, one 
member representing entrepreneurs from the biotechnology sector, two from 
environmental NGOs and one from a consumer organisation. Under the new law 
other representation from consumer groups, NGO’s etc. will give advice via the 
formation of a second commission or advisory body. 
 
Public notification which currently operates via government website updates under 
the old law, occurs at the point at which the bureau has received, checked and 
validated the submission of the dossier. Under the new law, this is to take place later 
in the process after the science-based commission has given a recommended 
approval. 
 
To assess how effectively this evolving system addresses the issue of compliance, it 
is necessary to look further into the historical and practical background of the current 
and political law. 
 
Poland embarked on a transition process initiated in January 1990. This involved a 
program of ‘deep institutional restructuring’ alongside economic reforms which 
occurred at a rapid pace and in a more radical and comprehensive way than in any 
other CEE country (Balcerowicz 1994). In this climate authors have argued that 
retraction of state intervention from science and technology policy was evident. This 
both as a response to reallocation of priorities where greater attention was given to 
the urgent state of hyperinflation, shortages, foreign debt etc. and also in 
concurrence with the attempt to reverse the extremely interventionalist role of the 
state during the previous socialist regime.  
 
The novelty of the technology might also be considered. The perception of 
environmental risk and uncertainty surrounding recombinant DNA technology 
especially in the area of GM crops and seeds, sees an increasingly vociferous call for 
public engagement and communication between state and non-state actors. This 
shift in the style of governance (Geels, Elzen et al. 2004) is a requirement which 
policy makers in former command economies have relatively little experience of.  
 
And so the important question which emerges is; what influences the formation of 
agri-biotech policy in this environment and what are the implications for EU 
accession requirements? 
 
1. Historical Embeddedness 
 
An initial answer to this question is that the style of governance follows a trajectory 
formed from past experiences. In the case of post soviet regimes, the many years of 
socialist rule create institutions and institutionalised procedures resulting in an in-built 
inertia and weak capacity for change. Evolutionary theory explains this phenomenon 
in terms of ‘path dependency’.  
 
“Evolutionary theory holds that learning is predominantly local and path 
dependent. In other words, new learning is built on previously established 
knowledge bases and it is virtually ‘blind’ to other learning trajectories. New 
experiences are interpreted according to established conceptual models, as is 
the case of policy makers in Central and Eastern Europe.” 
                                 (Acha and Balazs 1999) 
 
(Von Homeyer 2004), presenting the historical-institutionalist perspective states 
similarly that institutions are conditioned by the past with earlier events having a 
more significant influence on institutional developments than later events. A ‘positive 
feedback process’ results in the persistence of characteristics unless the regime is 
‘shocked’ in a way which causes these mechanisms to be disrupted.  
 
This idea of path dependent conditioning of institutions presents a problem for the 
issue of governance of a new technology. Innovation in the biotechnology field is 
usually accompanied by dynamic adjustments at institutional and social levels (e.g. 
industrial and science policy shifts, skill and education upgrading). Where this doesn’t 
occur we see an adjustment failure, or what may also be termed as a ‘rigidity’ 
(Tzotzos, 2000), with associated consequences. Since advancement and public 
funding in the area of plant and molecular biotechnology was characteristic of 
previous socialist soviet policy, familiarity amongst the scientific community exists 
and so the ‘shock’ Von Homeyer writes as being required for institutional learning, 
according to the above theoretical framing, may not occur with respect to the 
technology itself. Advances may occur without the comprehensive development of 
new governance mechanisms such as public participation which is perceived as 
being required by other EU countries and EU level institutions. The requirements for 
adjustment of governance mechanisms as set by broader EU policy may be 
interpreted by CEE policy makers based on their previously established conceptual 
models. The implications for this are two-fold.  
 
Firstly the process of change will be slow. Change occurs where a conflict or an 
experience cannot be made to fit the existing conceptual model, and so policy 
makers become aware there is a weakness present and an adjustment is made. 
Secondly the adjustment of institutions will result in locally or nationally-specific 
characteristics rather than imported models (Acha and Balazs, 1999). The 
repercussions of this are that EU legislation rather than being directly adopted, will 
attempt to be integrated or interpreted. The model of governance to include the 
various stakeholders will not be copied, but will evolve within the country subject to 
influences from both foreign examples of models and national conditions. 
 
What evidence is there for the retaining of older conceptual models and the following 
of historically embedded path dependent trajectories? Open coding of the interview 
data unearthed three examples.  
 
One given was that of Polish research funding, which is still heavily loaded towards 
public institutes, rather than promoting private industry opportunity or the 
infrastructure that supports it. The innovation technology push models of the 1950’s 
and 1960’s with a focus on the role of academia in the national system of innovation, 
is possibly still prominent in the thinking of policy makers and is in part retained. 
 
Secondly and with regard to government institutions, power is still very much 
centralised. The diffusion of GMO policy and power down to a regional level is a 
heavily debated topic in Poland. It was stated with reference to government 
administrations: 
 
“Its very hierarchical and not many people have power. The power structure is 
very different to the civil service here. It’s quite paralysing in a way because 
there’s only a few people who can make decisions.” 
 
The problem with the government in Poland generally is that the ministries 
behave very often like independent kingdoms.” 
 
“They are also very jealous for power and to share powers with the local 
governments” 
 
Transparency and accountability in decision making might also be compromised by 
restricted access to individuals: 
 
“It’s a different approach, they’re quite protected. And also if you ring someone 
in Hungary you get secretaries after secretaries after secretaries. You’re not 
allowed to speak to anyone and if you got there, they’re all in big high grand 
closed rooms. They’re not nearly as open as here.” 
 
As a third example the tax and financial redistribution structures can be examined.  
These were established under the older soviet regime and have not been 
restructured in a way that would effectively allow central government to devolve 
responsibility or its competence in the area of biotechnology regulation. However, 
regulation at the local or district level is at present not required since there are a very 
small number of applications and virtually none for deliberate release. 
 
2. The competing influence of accession requirements 
 
The above argument does not completely hold. Adjustments have been made and 
the predicted path trajectory along which biotechnology regulation might have 
followed has been at least partially disrupted. Transition and then accession has 
provided some of Von Homeyers ‘shock’ requirement. The need to comply with and 
incorporate the vast majority of the Acquis Communautaire has forced the 
acceptance of external advice through various learning and capacity building 
programmes. Evidence from the data show these to be highly influential. 
 
The SAPARD was a special accession program for rural development and involved 
candidate member states writing rural development plans. This programme saw the 
use of the pre-accession period as a planning period for how environmental policy 
was to take shape in the years ahead. Trajectories in this field were forced in a new 
direction by EU financial assistance and foreign expertise. 
 
In addition to SAPARD, the PHARE programme and various other technical 
assistance programmes occurring between the phases of transition and accession 
are likely to have been highly influential. These programmes often involved the 
travelling of Polish academics and policy makers to other countries in order to learn 
about alternative models of policy making and implementation. 
 
“Part of the Polish research organisation [KBN] went over to NSF in the States 
– the National Science Foundation. That was some of the research we were 
looking at. That model as I recall may have been absorbed from an NSF model 
… they had a peer review system where they did peer review rankings of the 
proposals which they leaned from the NSF. So I think there was a lot of 
transplantation of ideas that were funded by aid programmes and facilitated by 
analogous policy bodies in western countries.” 
  
Descriptions of capacity building programs illustrate the use of imported examples 
and models. One consultancy’s work on capacity building involved the competing use 
of European rather than American models. 
 
“We give perhaps examples of good practice from member states and how 
they’ve managed to implement EU legislation … Once you can see how other 
member states have understood what they’ve been allowed to do with it, then 
you needn’t reinvent the wheel yourself. So that’s what we’re trying to do really, 
is to pass on lessons learnt from member states.”  
 
To what extent do such imported EU-compliant models, succeed in establishing a 
working system for biotechnology regulation? It is argued here that there is a basic 
incompatibility founded on different conceptual models or understandings of the 
problem and that Poland’s political history prevents the effective use of these 
models.  
 
One important factor, as part of this basic incompatibility is the difference in approach 
taken by Poland and the EU to environmental negotiations, recognised by authors 
such as Paradowski (2003). The particular stance of the EU is noted for its stringent 
regulation, highly politicized debates and public mistrust of the government, scientists 
and industry (Bernauer and Meins 2003). This leads to an approach adopted by the 
EU which has seen an increased emphasis on multi-level governance and the 
importance of sub-national units of authority (Yoder 2003). This shift from 
government to governance is described as; 
 
“…a complex process involving the interaction of multiple stakeholders often 
with different definitions of ‘the problem’ in numerous forms at different political 
levels”.  
     (Murphy and Chataway 2005) 
 
This preferred mode of governance as taken by the EU requires the ability to engage 
with multiple stakeholders including publics and NGO’s.  The data finds that the most 
influential help came from Germany with the German legal model for GMO’s in 
particular, being used for Poland.  Speaking about the PHARE programme; 
 
“It was mainly concentrated on advice of the German experts to the Ministry of 
the Environment in creating GMO bureaucracy, de-lining the decision making 
process, training of laboratories… it played quite an important role in 
establishing the system, bio-safety system in this country.” 
 
The use of the German model in particular may have eased the path towards 
accession and simplified the regulatory harmonisation procedure in the policy area of 
GMO’s. However, research informants suggest it is a particularly “complex system” 
which is costly to operate in terms of bureaucracy, impacting on both industry and the 
viability of implementing a regulatory structure due to its absorbing significant 
financial resources. 
 
And so we come to a second important underlying factor in the issue of 
incompatibility which is capacity.  
 
3. Capacity for change 
 
The ability to implement a complex regulatory system, engage with stakeholders and 
break from rigidities and path dependencies in order to effect necessary change, 
requires capacities of various sorts. 
 
The extent of institutional capacity in its various forms can influence the direction 
policy making will take in the absence of a pre-existing framework. (Jehlicka and 
Tickle 2004) make a prediction that CEE countries will become passively compliant 
with EU requirements. This comes from analysing Petersons (1998) general theory of 
national integration strategies. Four strategies are presented, created by the degree 
of control a member state has over the external environment, which he terms 
“influence capacity” (and in this piece of work we take this to be the influence on 
overarching EU environmental policy making mechanisms). Secondly, the strategies 
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domestic priorities to 
external pressures. 
Jehlicka and Tickle’s prediction that CEE will either follow integration strategies 3 or 
4, comes from their observations that CEE countries do not have a strong tradition in 
environmental policy, the undemocratic character of the harmonisation process laid 
out in the Copenhagen criteria and the motivation for economic integration with the 
EU. They also draw on Thorhallsons argument (2000) that integration behaviour is a 
result of administration size, with small states having insufficient capacity to address 
all negotiations owing to lack of staff, expertise and other resources. To evaluate 
their prediction it is possible to investigate certain underlying assumptions – perhaps 
of influence capacity, two-way communication and to a greater extent, institutional 
administrative capacity. 
 
To look at institutional capacity in more depth, this investigation will use the argument 
developed by Jänicke et al (a contributor to the Berlin school of policy analysis). 
Jänicke argues that the successful implementation of policies does not occur through 
the sole use of single policy instrument but rather depends on attaining the flexibility 
to use a combination of multiple tools over time. He suggests that what is most 
important is the development of institutional capacity to allow this to occur (Andrews 
1997). To establish the components of institutional capacity, It is possible to use the 
following definition of institutional factors: 
 
“Institutional factors include political and legal structures and the rules and 
norms that produce a framework for interaction. In this area participation, 
integration, decentralisation and the capacity for strategic planning are seen as 
particularly important.” 
                        (Murphy, 2001) 
 
A second point Jänicke makes that is also relevant in this study is the situative 
context. This can either enable or constrain actors as they develop strategies 
(Murphy 2001). The actors followed in this study are the policy makers and regulators 
in Polish authority. The particular situative context of Poland in accession may 
present opportunities, for example the EU’s requirement for participation in policy 
making where the Polish government has less experience. Or the strict legislative 
requirements and precautionary approach may act as a constraint. The situative 
context of transition in terms of financial, administrative and other institutional 
capacities are an added dimension.  
 
If we take public participation and stakeholder engagement as an example, the data 
shows that stakeholder participation was in the initial stages, extremely poor. 
Authorities in CEE had difficulties in identifying their audience and finding appropriate 
methods of communication. A consultant reports that the situation in recent years 
seems to have improved somewhat; 
 
“After accession, the stakeholder consultation was much better, so they are 
definitely getting the hang of it. Also the stakeholders are realising that they 
have a right to be involved.” 
 
The issue of public engagement overlaps with that of communication and the 
capacity for effective multi-directional communication. With regards to communication 
between the government of Poland and the EU, communication appears to be at 
least partially bi-directional. EC officials are available for consultation according to 
one of the commission members. Another interviewee suggested that the EC does 
not respond well or quickly enough to the need for clarification of its policy 
documents. In the pre-accession phase during the Copenhagen summit of 2002, 
Poland appeared to have some bargaining power. They negotiated for concessions 
and changes in the common agricultural policy quotas, which they received. However 
in the general field of environmental agricultural policy it could be said that they were 
not involved sufficiently (H.Bennett, 2005), lending credence to Jehlicka and Tickles 
above assumptions. 
 
There are conflicting accounts here. Researchers and consultants working in Poland 
and CEE countries also report that during the first preparatory stages of accession, 
communication between government departments was particularly poor. However, 
this study finds that the way in which the current commission is constructed (despite 
members views that it doesn’t function effectively as a scientific body in weighing 
evidence), facilitates cross departmental communication in a unique way. There 
appears to be a small circle of scientists, commission members and commission 
advisors who are in close contact.  
 
“our department on GMO in the minister on environment, on an everyday basis 
are in contact. There are also in person, visitors from Brussels, also people 
from Germany, form Berlin. Majority of us are – I would say in American 
language ‘friends’, we know each other by first name… The real limit is the 
money for travel.” 
However, there is also no reference in the data which links GMO regulation to other 
policy areas. An integrated approach to policy making is not seen here, the issue is 
very much regarded in isolation. This might be reflective of the way the problem is 
approached by policy makers as a particular cognitive framing but the evidence is too 
weak to draw a conclusion here. 
 
As suggested by the extract above, that while recognising that stakeholder 
participation is a new practice and requirement for CEE governments, inexperience 
as a limiting factor comes secondary to the more crippling issue of financial capacity. 
Engaging NGO’s in government work is highly resource intensive and the funding 
simply doesn’t exist. Limitations in financial capacity are running themes throughout 
the course of the interviews undertaken. 
 
Lack of financial capacity impacts on other aspects of the regulatory process. Public 
and reference laboratories responsible for testing and traceability are badly 
equipped. Detection at the levels specified by EC regulations requires a Real Time 
PCR1 machine and also reaction kits which are extremely costly. There are however 
three established reference laboratories and several operating inspection labs. The 
scientific community in Poland is increasingly involved with European networks. 
These networks exchange protocols methods and results and perform ring tests with 
the same samples across different laboratories. Poland is also an active member of 
the OECD biotechnology harmonisation working group. This to a certain extent may 
compensate for some deficiencies, though human capacity in terms of scientific 
expertise in Poland is by all accounts highly proficient.  
 
In terms of other regulatory aspects the impacts of limited financial capacity are seen 
again: 
 
“In Berlin in Brandenburg, there are ten persons working in the GMO 
department – just in one district, district Berlin. In Polish Minister of 
Environment, we have 5 persons for the entire country. These people are very 
good. They’re young, well educated, they’re overloaded  with the job.” 
 
“The system is working pretty well, quite effectively with some difficulties of 
course, for example one of the difficult problems for the department of GMO’s 
                                                 
1 Polymerase Chain Reaction – used to detect particular DNA constructs in a gene sequence 
in the Minister of Environment is the problem of paying money to the referee’s 
for their job because of the shortage of money.” 
 
Interview transcripts with non-commission interviewees reveal that references to 
other funding problems were given also in relation to deficient IT in administrative 
systems, general wage levels for policy makers and the costs of monitoring and 
reporting. 
 
The unique situative context of this case reveals further complications in the 
accession process which prevent regulatory harmonisation but are outside of national 
control. The path towards EC compliance is complicated by the issue of co-existence 
which does not have a set of clear rules in EC directives. There are two possibilities 
for the future with regards to co-existence. One is that it will be written as a special 
technical directive or amendment by the Ministry of Agriculture. The second 
possibility is that it will be included in the new Law on GMO. The precautionary 
principle likewise does not have a legal definition in Europe. The precautionary 
principle as it is described in the Cartegena protocol is included in the existing law. 
The importance of overarching international laws and definitions such as the 
Cartegena protocol and the Aarhus convention are certainly not eclipsed by EU 
priorities and directives. And with issues such as the precautionary principle, where 
EU guidelines fall short of providing adequate guidance, interpretation does not 




The evolving system of regulation for agri-biotech in Poland is likely to be highly 
influenced by Poland’s historical and political background. The following of a path-
dependent trajectory may create a regulatory framework which complies with EU 
governance systems with increasing difficulty. Learning structures are theoretically 
important but more critical are the less tacit infra-structures which support the 
centralised system of decision making. For example the tax structure which prevents 
the delegation of authority to local levels, is the result of infrastructures put in place 
by the previous regime. These infrastructures are difficult and costly to disassemble, 
but do create an inertia which can also be described as a path-dependent rigidity. It 
is this which became apparent as a more important factor in this study. 
 
Given this definition of a path dependent rigidity, it is possible to evaluate the 
competing influence of accession as a factor.  The process of transition and 
accession acted as a catalyst in changing this path trajectory. The ‘shock’ as 
described by Von Homeyer (2004) and Fischer (2003) that disrupts inertia and the 
positive feedback systems, might be seen as being provided by the accession 
process and the inflexible requirements of EC directives.  
 
A second mechanism by which path dependency may have been disrupted, are the 
various pre-accession programmes (PHARE, SAPARD etc.) which in part at least, 
provided expertise and funding for the strengthening of capacities and supporting 
infra-structure as described above. 
 
A third mechanism involved the import of foreign models and processes by various 
means such as the travelling and learning of academics and policy makers to other 
member states and the US. The German model of regulation was highly influential 
and was provided by German experts in the pre-accession phase. It was 
implemented however, with outcomes that are not seen as beneficial or appropriate 
for Poland by members of the commission. (Though it should be noted that the 
opinions of the scientists in the commission are not entirely representative of general 
public opinion). There is further demonstrated, a fundamental incompatibility of the 
use of the German model in the Polish context. The German regulatory system is 
highly complex and is costly to implement. Poland has neither the funds nor the 
administrative capacity to implement this model successfully. An added dimension is 
that the highly stringent and bureaucratic regulations, impose costs on both the state 
and the producer which severely limits the possibility of the commercialisation of GM 
crops in Poland. The paradox which emerges is that due to the stringent nature of 
this regulatory system, there is currently very little GMO industry and a very small 
number of applications for experimental release, so allowing the administrative 
structure which enforces the regulations, to cope and maintain this framework. The 
system of enforcement, though in place and adequate on paper, has not been tested. 
With current staff capacity in the GMO bureau, a higher level of applications, along 
with processing and monitoring requirements would cripple the system. However, 
new laws at the national level which allow contained use to proceed without 
permission notification and new regulations at the EU level where the decision of 
placing on the market is now the competence of the EC, power is drawn away from 
the national structure and the burden is further reduced.  
 
The ability of the Polish regulatory system to align with EU policy is further 
compromised by the lack of EU guidance on specific issues such as the 
precautionary principle, co-existence, public engagement and the perceived lack (by 
those interviewed) of an EU-model which can be adapted. There are divergent 
interpretations across EU member states and this suggests that this is not a problem 
unique to Poland, to post transition, or to post accession countries. 
 
Although state administration in CEE is renowned to be large, that which is dedicated 
to the management of GMO policy in Poland is quite small. Thorhallsons’ (2000) 
argument that a small administrative capacity would affect integration behaviour by 
reducing in turn influence capacity, does ring true. This predicts that Poland will 
follow an acquiescent strategy of passive compliance and to an extent this is seen to 
be the case. This work does illustrate some of the reasons for this. With a low 
capacity for negotiation and stakeholder engagement, it is likely that the indigenous 
development of a national strategy or regulatory framework will be slow to develop. It 
can be asserted here that the situative context and inexperience with engagement 
constrains the development of strategies by actors in the Polish system, rather than a 
limit of capacity in terms of knowledge or scientific regulatory expertise. 
 
Intergovernmental communication does not appear to be a rigidity or barrier 
currently, though it may have been in the past. It is facilitated by this temporary 
regulatory structure with commission representatives from across various 
government departments. Given time, this study would benefit from an observation of 
changes which will occur after the new law in Poland is established. 
 The common theme running throughout this work is that of financial capacity. It 
determines administrative capability in terms of staff number and the capacity for 
government to engage in national and international negotiation. It also limits EU 
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